Juni Alonzo Church, Frege Gottlob. Der Gedanke. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, vol. 1 no. 2, pp. 58–Frege Gottlob. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. “Der Gedanke: Eine logische Untersuchung” (“The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”), in Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus I: 58– Supplement to Gottlob Frege Gall and E. Winter, Die analytische Geometrie des Punktes und der Geraden und ihre Anwendung auf .. [a] ‘Der Gedanke .
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Mind, New Series, Vol. Frege explores the cognitive phenomenon of taking something to be true. Frege eschews several commonsense uses of the word before stating that the sort of truth he wishes to discuss is that which is sought out by the sciences In an attempt to explicate the notion further, Frege gives a tentative catalog of things truth — which for the sake of discussion he assumes is a property — may be predicated of: Frege rejects the claim that truth may genuinely be predicated of pictures and ideas, for he thinks such predication requires a correspondence theory of truth, or, frfge theory which states that truth consists in some correspondence between a picture or idea and item in the external world.
Frege presents a convergent argument against all such theories a cluster of independently reinforcing points: These results lead Frege to conclude that truth is indefinable. Frege then asserts that, while we often speak of sentences as being true or false, what this talk actually consists in is ascribing truth gottlb falsehood to the senses contents of such sentences.
And the specific sorts of senses which may be sensibly ascribed truth or falsehood are, to Frege, the Thoughts. Thoughts are, to Frege, imperceptible: Frege uses the example of a specific sensed phenomenon: Frege argues that Thoughts may be expressed without thereby being asserted: Thoughts are expressed by propositional questions which are not assertoric as well as interrogative sentences which are assertoricindicating that the assertion of a Thought is a separate issue from its truth value e.
Thoughts and their associated truth values exist independently of use. The final properties Frege discusses are the under- and over-determination of Thoughts by sentential content. Thoughts may both be expressed in sentences ddr more content than is needed to express the Thought, or not expressed at all due to a sentence lacking certain features. Regarding the former case, Frege cites expressive and poetic words as not assisting in the expression of Thoughts; logically, such words are extraneous, whatever their function in everyday language use.
Frege concludes his exploration with a discussion of the ontological status of Thoughts. Gottlo already mentioned, Frege does not think Thoughts are external, sensible objects: Frege thinks Thoughts cannot be Ideas, for Ideas have specific properties that Thoughts do not: Frege disarms the skeptical claim that, for all we know, Ideas are all that exist.
Frege levels two arguments against the claim: To Frege, selves — conscious entities that possess Ideas — cannot be explained in terms of Ideas. He finds it is far more reasonable to posit the self as an independent object than it is to attempt an explanation of selves as specific portions of conscious content. The second argument is pragmatic: This is an unacceptable outcome and thus skepticism is to be rejected.
Thus, Thoughts are the bearers of truth, but do not exist as external objects nor as Ideas. This grasping in turn leads us to action; Thoughts as such have an indirect causal impact on the world. Through explaining det it is to treat something as true, Frege has discovered what he takes to be the nature of thinking more generally. Filed under Article Summaries.
Frege, Gottlob | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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