Lucid, highly readable, and full of rich social and political implications, “The Antitrust Paradox” illustrates how the purpose and integrity of law can be subverted. Winter Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at. War with Itself. Paul H. Brietzke. This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the. Jan 3, In his highly influential work, The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork asserted that the sole normative objective of antitrust should be to maximize.

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Practically, the shift from structuralism to price theory had two major ramifications for antitrust analysis. Infrastructure Gaps and the Architecture of Openne…. On a regular basis, Amazon would report losses, and its share price would soar.

Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox

In particular, current law underappreciates the risk of predatory pricing and how integration across distinct business lines may prove anticompetitive. Cross-subsidization schemes can have widely different effects, depending on how the two submarkets….

More specifically, restoring traditional antitrust principles to create a presumption of predation and to ban vertical integration by dominant platforms could help maintain competition in these markets.

Critically, not only has Amazon integrated across select lines of business, but it has also emerged as central infrastructure for the internet economy. The philosophy of the Sherman Act is that it should not exist. Antotrust said, given the political challenges of ushering in such a regime, strengthening and reinforcing traditional antitrust principles may—in the short run—prove most feasible.

The clearest example of how the company leverages its power brok online businesses is Boork Marketplace, where third-party retailers sell their wares. Amazon entered the e-book market by pricing bestsellers below cost. This basis for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate price-cutting echoed other decisions. But given the magnitude and accuracy of data that Amazon has collected on millions of users, tailored pricing is not simply a hypothetical power.

But the consumer welfare approach to antitrust is unduly narrow and betrays congressional intent, as evident from legislative history and as documented by a vast body of scholarship. This approach is misguided because it is much easier to promote competition at the point when a market risks becoming less competitive than it is at the point when a market is no longer competitive. A stricter approach would place prophylactic limits on vertical integration by platforms that have reached a certain level of dominance.


Leslie, Predatory Pricing and RecoupmentColum.

It is true that brick-and-mortar stores also collect data on customer purchasing habits and send personalized coupons. If we take the former approach, we should reform antitrust law to prevent this dominance from emerging or to limit its scope.

The policy goals of this regime are worth reviewing because they have analogues in antitrust and competition policy. Put differently, loss leading pays higher returns with platform-based e-commerce—and specifically with digital products like e-books—than it does with brick-and-mortar stores. Bork later modified his position on entry barriers when he consulted for Netscape in the Antitrust….

Although Amazon has clocked staggering growth—reporting double-digit increases in hork sales yearly—it reports meager profits, choosing to invest aggressively instead. Heaps of scholarship delve into this legislative history.

Antitrust Paradox – Robert H. Bork – Google Books

See generally ProMarkethttp: My argument is that gauging real competition in the twenty-first century marketplace—especially in the case of online platforms—requires analyzing the underlying structure and dynamics of markets. Although Matsushita focused on a paaradox issue—the summary judgment standard for claims brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which targets coordinationamong parties 94 —it has been widely influential in monopolization cases, which fall under Section 2.

First, as described in Section II. See Bensingersupra note Times July 9,http: Both the latitude granted by investors and control over data equip an incumbent platform to recoup losses in ways less obviously connected to the initial form of below-cost pricing. Google has stated that its biggest rival in search is not Bing or Yahoo, but…. Over the eight years of the Bush Administration, the Justice Department filed no monopolization cases.

Stonesupra noteat In the United States, the first case applying public utility regulations to a private business was Munn v. Why competitive process and structure matter The current framework in antitrust fails to register certain forms of anticompetitive harm and therefore is unequipped to promote real competition—a shortcoming that is illuminated and amplified in the context of paraxox platforms and data-driven markets.


Two Models for Addressing Platform Power If it is true that the economics of platform markets may encourage anticompetitive market structures, there are at least two approaches we can take.

The Antitrust Paradox second edition. Although largely out of fashion today, public utility regulations were widely adopted in the early bprk, as a way of regulating the technologies of the industrial age. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: Retail competitors are left with two undesirable choices: The graph below captures the general trend. The way that Amazon has leveraged its dominance as an online retailer to vertically integrate into delivery is instructive on several fronts. Of these three traditional policies, nondiscrimination would make the most sense, while antitrusr and investment requirements would be trickier to implement and, perhaps, would less obviously address an outstanding deficiency.

In other words, what was at stake in keeping markets open—and keeping them free from industrial monarchs—was freedom. Omarovasupra noteat Specifically, it considers how the economics and business dynamics of online platforms create incentives for companies to pursue growth at the expense of profits, and how online markets and control over data may enable new forms of anticompetitive activity.

Bezos, Letter to ShareholdersAmazon. To date, the Obama Administration anfitrust filed only one case, hardly evidencing a major shift in tactics. Profits were always promised tomorrow.

The Antitrust Paradox – Wikipedia

Given that Amazon increasingly serves as essential infrastructure across the internet economy, applying elements of public utility regulations to its business is worth considering. For example, when pqradox its contract with Hachette last year, Amazon demanded payments for services including the pre-order button, personalized recommendations, and an Amazon employee assigned to the publisher.

Two-sided markets are platforms that have two distinct user groups that offer each other network benefits. While the FTC closed the investigation without bringing any charges, leaks later revealed that FTC staff had concluded that Google abused its power on three separate counts.